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Comments and Casenotes
Effect Of Power Of Revocation Vesting Subsequent
To Execution Of Deed Of Trust On Measuring
Period of Perpetuities
RoBERT

E. POWELL

Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile Safe Deposit and Trust Co.1
In 1876, H and W executed a deed of trust covering certain real and personal property to T in trust for W for life,
with full power to appoint by will to or for the benefit of
her children or her descendants, in such a manner as she
should see fit. She also had the power to appoint any of
the property she should wish to her present or any future
husband, or if she should have no children 'or descendants
living at her death, to appoint the property to whomever
she desired. In default of appointment, it was provided that
the property was to pass in trust for the benefit of her
children, if any, per capita and the issue of any deceased
child, per stirpes. Furthermore, in the event that the
trustee, T, should die during the life of W, she was to
have the power to appoint a new trustee or to revoke the
trust and stand seized of all the property.
On July 24, 1895, T, died and thereafter, in accordance
with her power, W appointed a new trustee, R, by a deed
dated August 6, 1895. W died in 1924, leaving a will in
which she, by reference to her power, in her residuary
clause, appointed the trust property to R in trust to divide
the income into four parts, one of which was to be paid
to each of her four childhen respectively for life. Upon the
death of her children, the trust, in respect to each child's
portion, was to continue for twenty years at which time
the corpus was to be distributed among her grandchildren.
One of her children was en ventre sa mere at the time
the original deed of trust was perfected; the remaining
three were born after the execution of that deed but prior
to the appointment of the second trustee in 1895. After
the death of one of W's children, the appellee, as trustee
under W's will, instituted suit for construction of the deed
of trust.
'220 Md. 534, 155 A. 2d 702 (1959).

1960]

FITZPATRICK v. MERCANTILE

The lower court determined that the secondary limitations were valid under the rule against perpetuities, the
chancellor concluding that the period of perpetuities was
measurable from the date of execution of the second deed.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, since W
had originally possessed a contingent right of revocation
which became vested for a period of time, and the rule
against perpetuities has no application to a trust which is
subject to a power of revocation, the period of perpetuities
had to be measured from the date of the second deed.
Therefore, the conclusion was reached that, since the
secondary limitations had to vest within a life in being
(the children of W constituting measuring lives) and
twenty-one years, they did not violate the rule against
perpetuities.2
The instant case raises for the first time in Maryland or
any other jurisdiction, so far as this writer has been able
to find, the issue as to whether the period of perpetuities,
with respect to the provisions of an inter vivos trust and
an appointment made in accordance with a testamentary
power granted by the deed of trust, should be measured
from the date of expiration of a power, given to the initial
life tenant, to either appoint a new trustee or to revoke
the trust on the happening of a contingency, which occurred. In order to resolve this issue, it is necessary to
discuss certain collateral questions: (1) what is the nature
and purpose of the rule against perpetuities; (2) what
is the legal effect of the rule upon powers of appointment;
(3) from what point of time does the law require that an
appointment made under a testamentary power of appointment be measured; and (4) is the rule with respect to
ascertaining the point of commencement of the period of
perpetuities any different when the power of appointment
is granted by a revocable deed of trust?
The rule against perpetuities, as stated by Professor
Gray, is that: "No interest is good unless the condition must
be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest.'3 To this period
2
Judge Henderson filed a dissent in which he agreed with the findings
of Court except on the primary issue as to whether the fact that W
possessed a power 'of revocation for a short period of time caused the
date from which the period of perpetuities was to be measured to be
the date of the second deed. See infra, circa, n. 39.
1GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942) § 201. (Italics
added.) This general definition of the rule was cited by the Maryland
Court of Appeals In Vickery v. Maryland Trust Co., 188 Md. 178, 52 A.
2d 100 (1947) ; Fitzpatrick v. Mercantlle-Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
supra, n. 1.
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the courts have added actual periods of gestation. 4 Thus,
the permissible period of perpetuities may extend to an
outside limit of twenty-one years plus actual periods of
gestation beyond some life in being at the creation of the
interest.
The rule is one of law and not one of construction, and
applies equally to contingent legal and equitable future
interests in both real and personal property.5 Thus the
rule is directed solely at interests which might vest too
remotely, if at all, as distinguished from interests which
have a long duration.6 This point was stressed by the
Court in Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan,7 wherein it said:
"The object of the rule is to prevent the limitation
of estates for future vesting upon contingencies which
are not certain to happen within the period [of perpetuities]. * * * It relates to the commencement of
future interests, and not to their duration, and it is
therefore immaterial whether the estate limited is
in fee, for life or for years, provided the event upon
which the limitation depends is certain to occur within
the period which the rule defines.""
The rule was developed for the purpose of preserving
free alienation of property; basically it prevents property
from being held extra commercium for lengthy periods of
timeY In view of the purpose of the rule, it was held in
' Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A. 2d 672 (1944) ; Ryan v. Ward,
192 Md. 342, 348, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949); Thellusson v. Woodford, 32 Eng.
Rep. 1030 (1805). It is noted that the Court of Appeals has also
referred to the additional period covering periods of gestation as "n
fraction of a year", Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 169-172 (1867);
Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; and as
"ten months", Ortman v. Dugan, 130 Md. 121, 100 A. 82 (1917) ; Hawkins
v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 A. 212 (1928). Nonetheless, it is believed that
the rule, as properly stated in Maryland includes only actual periods of
gestation.
5Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 275, 57 A. 609 (1904) ; Hawkins v.
Ghent, 154 Md. 264, 265, 140 A. 212 (1928); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v.
Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935) ; Fitzpatrick v. Merchantile-Safe
Deposit and Trust Co., supra, n. 1. See also: Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C.
101, 52 S.E. 2d 229 (1949); McEwen v. Enoch, 167 Kan. 119, 204 P.
2d 736 (1949); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199
S.W. 2d 344 (1947).
1Curtis v. Maryland Baptist Ass'n., 176 Md. 430, 5 A. 2d 836, 121
A.L.R. 1516 (1915); Salisbury v. Salisbury, 92 Kan. 644, 141 P. 173
(1914); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121 N.J. Eq. 366,
189 A. 653 (1937). See also discussion in Bowerman v. Taylor, 126 Md.
203, 94 A. 652 (1915) ; Ortman v. Dugan, supra, n. 4.
7 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935).
'Ibid., 106.
Hollander v. Central Metal Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 A. 442 (1908) ; Ryan
v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v.
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Hollander v. Central Metal Co.'° that a covenant by the
lessor, his heirs or assigns for the redemption of a ground
rent under a 99 year lease was not open to any of the
objections against perpetuities, even though it might not
be exercised within the period set out by the rule. In so
holding, the Court said:
"Property is not thereby placed extra commercium.
On the contrary, these leasehold interests devolve
upon the personal representatives of the owner, are in
terms made assignable, and they, as well as the ownerships in fee under the denomination of 'ground rents',
are subjects of daily transfer, and are constantly sought
for a safe investment of capital.""
In applying the rule against perpetuities to powers of
appointment, two basic problems arise: first, it must be
ascertained whether the power itself is valid; and second,
whether the exercise of the power is valid. In order to
properly analyze these problems it is necessary to distinguish between general and special powers. A power is
said to be general when there are no restrictions placed
upon its exercise, nor as to the persons in whose favor
the power is to be exercised. 2 Under the view taken by
most courts, the donee of a general power is entitled to
appoint the property to anyone including himself and his
creditors. In Maryland, however, a general power is restricted in that the donee is not permitted to appoint to
himself or his creditors, unless expressly given such power
by the donor. 3 On the other hand, a special power is a
power which is restricted as to the person or persons to
whom an appointment can be made.'4 Thus, if the donee is
Sheehan, supra, n. 7; GRAY, op. cit. 8upra, n. 2, §§ 2, 2.1; SIMES AND
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1956) § 1222: Jones, The Rule Against
Perpetuities As Applied To Powers Of Appointments In Maryland, 18 Md.

L. Rev. 93, 108 (1958).
10109

Md. 131, 71 A. 442 (1908).

"Ibid.,
159, quoting from :Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876).
12 liamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 479, 64 A. 2d 704
(1949); Henderson v. Rogan, 159 F. 2d 855 (9th Cir. 1947); In re
Rowland's Estate, 241 P. 2d 781, 73 Ariz. 337 (1952) ; Clauson v. Vaughn,
147 F. 2d 84 (1st Cir. 1945); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d
813, 163 A.L.R. 1444 (1946); Srims AND SMITrr, op. cit. supra, n. 9,
§ 875; 3 RESTATEMENT, PaoPEnr (1940) § 320; Jones, op. cit. supra, n.
9, 94.
I Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888) ; Connor v. O'Hara, 188
Md. 527, 53 A. 2d 33 (1947) ; Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., ibid.,
Jones, op. cit. supra, n. 9, 94-95; Note, Rights of Creditors Under a Testamentary General Power of Appointment, 4 Md. L. Rev. 297 (1940).
",See discussion in O'Hara v. O'Hara, 184 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d 813, 163
A.L.R. 1444 (1946); Fitzpatrick v. MercantilemSafe Deposit and Trust
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restricted in making his appointment to a limited group of
persons, not including himself, the power is special. Therefore, in the principal case, W had both a special and a
general power, since she had the power to appoint only to
her children and her present or any future husband, and
in addition, in the event that she had no children or
descendants to anyone whomever. The first power was
clearly special, but the latter, although contingent upon a
failure of issue, was general. It is also important, at this
point, to make a distinction between testamentary powers
and powers presently exercisable. A power is testamentary
if it can be exercised only by will. 5 On the other hand,
if it can be exercised by deed it is a power presently exercisable.' 6 Both general and special powers may be either
testamentary or presently exercisable. In the present case
both of W's powers of appointment were testamentary.
Regardless of whether the power be general or special
it must vest in the donee within the period of perpetuities.
If it does not, it is void. 17 As long as a general power
presently exercisable vests in the donee within the period,
it is valid.'" However, a special power or a testamentary
power (whether general or special) must not only vest but
must also be exercised within the period. 19 Thus, a testaCo., 220 Md. 532, 155 A. 2d 702, 706 (1959) ; it is arguable in Maryland
that a general power is actually a special power. For some purposes it
is so treated while for others it is treated as an actual general power.
Cf. Blalls v. Dampman, ibid, denying the donee of a general testamentary
power the right to devise the subject matter for payment of her debts,
with Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., ibid, where the normal rules
were applied to a creation of a new power by the exercise of a general
testamentary power.
' SIMES AND SMITH, Op. Cit. 8upra, n. 9, § 874; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPRTY (1940) § 321; Jones, op. cit. supra, n. 9, 95.
16Ibid.
17

Levenson v. Manly, 119 Md. 517, 87 A. 261 (1913) ;

SIMES AND SMITH,

Op. Cit. supra, n. 9, § 1272; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 390;
Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Hiarv. L. Rev. 638, 651-653 (1938) ;
Jones, op. cit. 8upra, n. 9, 96; Fitzpatrick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and
Trust Co., supra, n. 14, 706, ". . . if a power can be exercised at a time
beyond the limit of the rule it is bad. . . ."; Burlington County Trust
Co. v. Di Castelcicala, 2 N.J. 214, 66 A. 2d 164 (1949).
sMifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. St. 205, 15 A. 525 (1888) ; of. Ortman v.
Dugan 130 Md. 121, 100 A. 82 (1917) ; SIMES AND SMITH, Op. cit. supra,
(1944) § 390(1); Jones, The
n. 9. § 1273; 4 RESTATEMENT, 'ROPERTY
Rule Against Perpetuities As Applied To Powers Of Appointment in Maryland, 18 Md. L. Rev. 93, 97 (1958) ; Leach, op. cit. supra, n. 17, 653.
19 Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra, n. 12; SIMEs AND SMITH,
op. Cit. supra, n. 9, § 1273; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 390 (2) ;
Jones, loo. cit. supra, n. 18; Leach, op. cit. supra, n. 17, 652. It is noted
that there can be no objection to a power granted to a donee who is in
e88e at the creation of the power. See: Collins and Bernard v. Foley, 63
Md. 158 (1884).
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mentary power granted to a person not in esse when the
power was created is necessarily void. In the principal case
the testamentary power given to W was valid, since she
was in esse when the deed granting her the power was
executed and it could only be exercised in her lifetime.
The second question, whether the exercise of the power
was valid, is more difficult to answer. At the outset, one
must understand the underlying legal theories with relation
to the exercise of a power. Under the law the property,
over which one has been given a power of appointment,
is considered to be that of the donor, or of his estate, until
the power is exercised; and the exercise of the power is
held to pass the property directly from the donor to the
appointee.2" Conversely, the appointment is considered to
relate back to the donor, and as a result is to be read into
the instrument creating the power. 2 What might be considered an exception relates to general powers presently
exercisable. The courts have expressed the view that, since
a donee of such a power has virtually as much control
over the property as he has over his own and can appoint to
himself or his creditors, for the purpose of the rule against
perpetuities, the exercise of the power is not to be read back
into the instrument creating the power.2 2 Essentially the
concept is that the property is readily transferable by the
donee at all times either by making a direct appointment
or by appointing to himself and thereafter alienating it
for his own benefit. Therefore, it is not held extra conmercium, and is not subject to the rule against perpetuities.
On the other hand, property subject to special power or a
testamentary power (whether general or special) is held
extra commercium. The limitations placed on a special
w Connor v. O'Hara, 188 Md. 527, 53 A. 2d 33 (1947) ; Lamkin v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949) ; Pearce, et al. v.
Van Lear, 5 Md. 85 (1853); Ray v. Pung, 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1822);
3 RESTATEMENT, 'PROPERTY (1940) § 318 (1), comment b.
Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 275, 57 A. 609 (1904) ; Pearce et al.
v. Van Lear, ibid., 89; Commonwealth v. William's Ex'rs., 13 Pa. St.
29 (1850) ; Connor v. O'Hara, ibid; GRAY, THIE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
(4th ed. 1942) §§ 514, 515, 525, 526; SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS
(2d1 ed. 1956) §§ 1274, 1275; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 392;
Jones, op. oft. supra, n. 18, 101.
2SIMES AND SMITH, ibid., § 1274; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) §
391; GRAY, op. cit. 8upra, n. 21, § 524; Jones, toc. cit. supra, n. 18. It Is
noted that in Maryland the donee of a general power is incapable of
appointing to himself, see supra, n. 13. Therefore, it is less arguable that
he has power akin to ownership. However, the Maryland Court by its
holding in Ortman v. Dugan, supra, n. 18 has implied acceptance of the
view that the limitations created under a general power presently exercisable are to be measured from the termination of the power. See also
discussion In Collins and Bernard v. Foley, supra, n. 19, 162-3.
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power prevent the property from being freely alienable,
while property subject to a testamentary power is completely withdrawn from commerce during the life of the
donee, since the law forbids an inter vivos execution
or contract for later execution of such a power. 3 Therefore,
the rule that an appointment is to be read back into the
instrument creating the power is applicable to special or
testamentary powers. Following this concept, the courts
have universally held that the period of perpetuities with
relation to a special or testamentary power is to be measured from the date of execution of the instrument creating
the power. Thus, if there were no additional factors in
the present case, the appointment made by W in her will
would have been void with respect to the secondary
limitations. Her provisions, for the property to be held
in trust for the benefit of her children for life and thereafter for the trust to continue for twenty years after
which time the corpus was to 'be distributed among her
grandchildren or their descendants, would have to be
added to the life estate given to her under the deed of
trust. Since her children, with the exception of one which
was en ventre sa mere, were not in being when the original
deed of trust was executed, her life would be taken as
the measuring life, and the secondary limitations would
not necessarily vest within twenty-one years after her
death.24 Therefore, those limitations would 'be void.
The question then arises whether the fact that W, for a
period of time, had an absolute power to revoke the trust,
affects the validity of the secondary limitations. The rule
against perpetuities applies to contingent beneficial inter25
ests in a trust as well as to contingent legal interests.
Therefore, the beneficial interests or gift over following
Wilks v. Burns, 60 Md. 64, 73 (1883); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md.
321, 324, 44 A. 2d 813 (1945); Palmer v. Loche, L.R. 15 Ch. D. 294
(Eng. 1880); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N.Y. 290, 114
N.E. 389, 390 (1916); 4 RESTATEMENT, 'PROPERTY (1944) § 339, 340. See
Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 479, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949)
"... the power must be exercised in the manner directed, that is, if the
grantor says it shall be exercised by will, it cann'ot be exercised by deed."
Since the donee split (the trust into four parts for the separate benefit
of each of her children, the gift over following the life estate in the
child that was en ventre sa mere at the creation of the deed of trust Of
1876, in any case might have been valid- his life being usable as the
measuring life. !See Turner v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., 148 Md. 371; 129
A. 294 (1925). For the purposes of this comment onsideration will
only be given to the law in relation to the limitations following the life
estates in the children born after that deed.
1 Gambrill v. 'Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 A. 1094 (1914); Safe Dep. &
Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935).
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a trust must vest within the period of perpetuities. 5 Generally this period is measured by looking forward from
the date of the instrument creating the trust.27 Thus, under
a trust created by deed the measuring period, for the
purposes of the rule, runs from the date of execution of
the deed, while under a trust created by the settlor's will,
the measuring period is limited from the date of his death.
Similarly, where one has a testamentary power to appoint
the corpus of the trust or beneficial interests thereunder,
such appointment is to be read back into the instrument
creating the trust.2"
Where the settlor of a trust retains the power to revoke
it, or gives such power to the person who, for the time
being, is entitled to the property, the courts have generally
held that the measuring period for purposes of the rule
against perpetuities is to be determined from the date
when such power expires, which is usually the death of the
person having such power.2 9 It is simply a question of
whether the trust is destructible; if so, the property is not
actually extra commercium. In other words, so long as
the trust under which the property is held is revocable
at will, it is not within the purview of the rule. The Court
in Graham v. Whitridge3° recognized this when they defined a perpetuity as being:
"A future limitation whether executory or by way
of remainder and of either real or personal property,
which is not to vest until after the expiration of, or
will not necessarily vest within, the period fixed and
prescribed by law for the creation of future estates
and interests, and which is not destructible by the
person for the time being entitled to the property
Gambrill v. Gambrill, ibid., Turner v. Safe Dep. & Trust Co., supra,
n. 24.
2Ryan
v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 348, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949); Bowerman
v. Taylor, 126 Md. 203, 212, 94 A. 652 (1915); Goldberg v. Erich, 142
Md. 544, 548, 121 A. 365 (1923), Hawkins v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 265, 140
A. 212 (1928).
1' Ryan v. Ward, ibid.; Gambrill v. Gambrill, supra, n. 25; Hawkins
v. Ghent, ibid.; Thomas v. Gregg, 76 Md. 169, 24 A. 418 (1892).
Ryan v. Ward, supra, n. 27, 353; Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248,
274, 57 A. 609 (1904); Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179
A. 536 (1935) ; GRAY, op. cit. supra, n. 21, §§ 203, 524.1; Leach, Perpetuitie
in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 662-3 (1938) ; Jones, The Rule Aagainst
Perpetuities As Applied to Powers of Appointment in Maryland, 18 Md.
L. Rev. 93, 108-109 (1958) ; SIMEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed.
1956), § 1250.
- 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609 (1904).
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subject to future limitations except with the concurrence 'of the individual interested under that limitation.""'
In Ryan v. Ward 2 the court, measuring from the date of
an inter vivos deed of trust, struck down certain end limitations which gave the corpus of the trust to the children
of the settlor's son or their descendants following successive life estates in the settlor and his son, although the
settlor had retained the right to withdraw portions of the
corpus so long as such withdrawals did not surpass a certain figure each year. In so holding the Court cited the
Restatement of Property which provides:
"The period of time during which an interest is
destructible pursuant to the uncontrolled volition and
for the exclusive personal benefit of the person having
such a power of destruction is not included in determining whether the limitation
is invalid under the rule
' 's3
against perpetuities.
Recognition was given to the fact that "it was the indestructibility ... of future interests which forced upon the
judges the rule against perpetuities . . . ," but the court
could not find that the trust in the Ryan case was destructible. It was reasoned that at the creation of the trust
it was foreseeable that the settlor could over the course
of years withdraw the entire corpus of the trust, but at no
one particular time could he exercise an uncontrolled
volition and revoke the entire trust. Therefore, it was
concluded that the trust was not destructible and its provisions would have to be tested with respect to the rule
against perpetuities by measuring from the date the deed
became operative.
The Court in the Ryan case, as in the principal case,
relied in part upon two analogies. First, that the situation
presented by limitations created under a destructible trust,
or a power of appointment given under such a trust, is
analogous to limitations following an estate tail, in which
case the period of perpetuities is computed from the termination of the estate tail.3 ' Second, that the situation
is similar to that of gifts in default of general powers exercisable by either deed or will, in which case the period
8t

Ibid., 274 (emphasis added.)
192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949).

(1944) § 373.
"Ibid., comment b. See also, Leach, op. cit. 8upra, n. 29, 663.
834 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
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is measured from the date of expiration of the power."
In each of these cases the analogy exists because the limitations may themselves be destroyed by the exercise of
some power which prevents them from taking effect. If
an estate tail is disentailed, the limitations following it are
ineffective; and if the donee of a power exercises his power,
the takers in default are cut off, unless the appointment
is to them. Likewise, if a power of revocation over a trust
is exercised and the donee thereby stands seized of the
property in his own right, he holds the property absolutely
and may freely alienate it. The analogy is especially strong
with relation to limitations following estates tail, since
such estates by statute were made freely alienable and the
act of alienation in and of itself acted to disentail the
estate. 6 Alienation of property held under a revocable
trust only requires one additional step, and hence, it can
be said that such property is freely alienable. In neither
of these cases can the property be considered as being held
extra commercium, and therefore, the rule against perpetuities does not apply.
An analogy also exists between a general power
presently exercisable and a power to revoke a trust. Under
the former the donee can appoint to anyone including himself (except in Maryland). He has, in fact, as much control
over the property as an actual jowner would have. It only
takes one act to make the property his own so as to be
able to alienate it for his own benefit, and even if he does
not take that measure 'he can appoint it at will and readily
transfer it to whomever he pleases. For this reason limitations created under such powers are not considered by
the law to be invalid as long as they must vest within the
period set by the rule measuring from the death of the
donee.17 There is no logical reason why the same result
should not be reached with respect to revocable trusts,
since the donee can as easily perfect title in himself and
thereafter alienate the property at will. In fact, there is
more reason for holding the rule against perpetuities to be
inapplicable to recovable trusts in Maryland than to general
powers presently exercisable, since by revocation of the
5 Leach, ioc. cit. 8upra, n. 29; see discussion in Jones, op. cit. supra,
n. 29, 106.
M See 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, § 22. This analogy is weakened somewhat due to the fact that it is merely historical, since under the cited
statute a fee tail has been held to constitute a fee simple absolute. See
Thomas v. Higgins, 47 Md. 439 (1878).
SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. supra, n. 29, § 1274; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
(1944) § 391; GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942), n.
29, 101.
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trust the donee of the power of revocation can become
absolutely seized of the property, whereas the donee of a
general power can, only transfer to another and can never
appoint to himself or to someone in a manner that the
benefit would actually be cast on himself, unless the donor
explicitly gave him such power.
Thus, it is clear under the law that if a power to revoke
a trust and thereby become the sole owner of the trust
property is certain to be exercised, if at all, within a life
in being and twenty-one years, as in the present case, then
the power to revoke is itself not too remote, and limitations
created by the exercise of a testamentary power are to be
measured for purposes of the rule from the date of termination of the power to revoke. However, should the result be
any different, if the power to revoke is itself contingent?
In regard to situations of this nature it has been stated that:
"The destructibility prerequisite for an application
of the rule ...exists only when some person possesses
a complete power of disposition over the subject
matter of the future interests which have been limited
and can exercise this power of disposition for his own
exclusive benefit. * * * The destructibility prerequisite
for an application of the rule ... can exist when the
power of disposition (or of revocation) is not presently
exercisable at the time of its creation, provided that
the period, during which the exercise of such power
is postponed, does not invalidate all interests created
by the exercise of such' 38power, and thus, in effect invalidate the power itself.
Thus, the contingent power of revocation given to W by
the deed of trust was subject to the rule. However, there
is no question but that it was valid. Viewing it from its
creation it is clear that it not only had to vest, but had to
be exercised within her lifetime; and since she was one
of the settlors of the trust, she was clearly a life in being
884 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944)
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(emphasis added.)

See also SIMES & SMrIi, op. cit. 8upra, n. 29, § 1272. Judge Henderson,
in dissenting, could not agree that this section of the Restatement supported the position taken by the Court and advocated herein. He laid
emphasis upon the second clause of the omitted sentence which states:,
"Similarly it [the destructibility prerequisite] does not exist when
the power of revocation is exercisable only with the concurrence of
one or more persons other than the settlor, or i8 otherwise 8ubject
to any condition8 precedent." (Emphasis added.)
It cannot logically be said that the latter clause supports the position
taken by the dissent, when read In context with the whole sentence and
comment.
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at the creation of the power. It, therefore, becomes clear
that the destructibility prerequisite was present, at last
during the period of time which elapsed between, the death
of the original trustee, on July 24, 1895, and the appointment of a new trustee by the second deed which was executed by W on August 6, 1895. At any time during that
period W, acting on her sole volition, could have revoked
the trust and stood seized of the property. Since the trust
was destructible, the property was not held extra commercium and hence was not subject to the rule against
perpetuities. Therefore, the rule could not logically be
held to be operative with regard to this trust and the limitations created under the testamentary power, until W's
power to revoke was extinguished in August of 1895.
In measuring the end limitations in the instant case,
some reference must be made to the so-called "second look"
doctrine. Although the general rule provides that, if, in
viewing the circumstances as they might occur from the
ascertained date for commencing the period of perpetuities,
it is possible that a limitation will not vest within the
period, it is void, the courts, for the purpose of testing
limitations created under powers of appointment, have
adopted a slightly different rule. The "second look" doctrine
takes cognizance 'of the facts which were known to the
donee of a power when such power was exercised, but
which were not certain when the original instrument was
executed. 9 The result has been stated to be that:
".... in determining the validity of the interests
created by the donee in the exercise of the power, the
facts existing at the time he exercises the power may
be considered although the time period is computed
from the date the donor created the power."40
In the instant case, if the limitations made by W in her
will were strictly read back into the trust deed, they would
have been invalid, since that deed gave her power to appoint
to her "children", which she did, but without the knowledge
that all of the children she would have were in esse when
the 1895 deed of trust was executed, it would have to be
recognized that one, if not all, of her children could have
been born after the execution of the original deed, and
hence, the limitations over to their children 20 years after
GRAY, op. ct.
8upra, n. 37, § 523.5; SIMES & SMITH, op. cit. 8upra, n.
29, § 1274; 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) § 392; Jones, op. cit. supra,
n.429, 102.
oJones, too. cit. supra, n. 39.
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their death would be too remote. However, by applying
the "second look" doctrine, although the Court did not refer
to it specifically, recognition was taken of the fact that W
knew that her "children" were in, esse when the deed of
trust was executed. Therefore, their lives could be used
as lives in being, and the limitations over to her grandchildren, twenty years following the deaths of her children,
were not too remote.
In conclusion, it is clear that the Court reached the
proper result in the instant case. Under the original deed
of trust, W was given a contingent power to revoke the
trust or appoint a new trustee, if the trustee died during
her lifetime. This power was not void for remoteness, and
in 1895 the specified event happened causing an absolute
power of revocation to become vested in W. Since the law
provides that the rule against perpetuities is not applicable
to the provisions of a revocable trust, and that limitations
created under a testamentary power of appointment are
to be read back into the instrument creating the trust,
thereby becoming provisions of such instrument, the provisions of the trust in the instant case, including the limitations created under W's power of appointment, were not
subject to the rule during the period in which -shepossessed
her right of revocation. Furthermore, since the law specifies that the rule is to be applied from the date of termination of the power to revoke, logically it could only be
applied from the date of execution of the second deed of
trust.
Criticism cannot be leveled at the Court for looking
at the facts as W had known them to be when she exercised
her testamentary power of appointment, and recognizing
that she knew that her children were all in esse when she
executed the second deed of trust. In so doing, the Court
clearly applied the so-called "second look" doctrine, although not specifically referring to it. It would have been
desirable if the Court had made specific reference to that
doctrine, and thus, cleared up what little doubt remains
as to whether it has been recognized in Maryland.

